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 A volume on “emotional minds” in the early modern period would be incomplete 
without a discussion of the passions of Christ. His passions constitute a centerpiece of the 
Christian narrative, which itself forms the backdrop for much of early modern thought. 
As Sabrina Ebbersmeyer makes clear in our Introduction, the papers of this volume 
consider the boundary between human passions and reason, the relation between passions 
and cognition, and the means by which passions might help in pursing the truth.1 The 
suffering of Christ is the point at which the passions, reason, and cognition collide. This 
paper explores the components of that collision and examines how Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716) and Anne Finch Conway (1631-79) respond to them.  
 
1. Knowledge and Suffering: The Passions of Christ 
 The most relevant part of the Christian story goes like this. Jesus of Nazareth was 
tortured in significant ways after his condemnation. Among other things, he was whipped 
and forced to wear a crown of thorns while carrying a cross, an instrument of his own 
death. These tortures are both physical and psychological. In the last moments of his life, 
he felt forsaken by God, his father. It is very gruesome stuff.  
 Its gruesomeness produced some difficult philosophical problems. For example, 
the scholastics were concerned to explain how Jesus, as God, could suffer. If Christ 
suffered physical pain, then his divinity appears uncertain. If he did not, then his sacrifice 
for humanity seems diminished. Many philosophers sought to find a way to 
accommodate the real pain of Christ’s suffering within his divinity. Scholastics debated 
the proper way to do this. As Dominik Perler notes, by the late 13th century, the physical 
                                                
1 See Ebbersmeyer’s Introduction. As far as I can tell, there has been no systematic study by historians of 
philosophy of the place of Christ’s passions in the wider context of early modern views of the passions. For 
example, neither The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy nor the new Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe contains nothing on the topic. See, Garber/Ayers 1998; 
Wilson/Clarke 2011. Jolley’s paper “The Relation between Theology and Philosophy” in Garber/Ayers 
1998 ignores the topic. 
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pain of Christ was taken to be a sensory passio distinct from other sorts of passions. 
Philosophers like John Buridan and John Duns Scotus offered explanations tied closely to 
an account of the will.2 In this paper, I ignore these worries. The focus here is the 
relations among passions, reason, and cognition.3 
 Recent medievalists have argued that a “revolution of feeling” occurred in the 12th 
-13th centuries when devotional literature began to focus on “the Passion.” As J.A.W. 
Bennett puts it: “one of the greatest revolutions in feeling that Europe has ever 
witnessed” occurred during that period: the rise of compassionate devotion to the 
suffering of Christ.4 According to Sarah McNamer in a recent study, between the 12th and 
16th centuries, Europe saw an increase in the richness and variety of “affective 
meditations” on the passions.5 These meditations “ask their readers to imagine 
themselves present at scenes of Christ’s suffering and to perform compassion for that 
suffering victim in a private drama of the heart.” Not only was the meditator supposed to 
feel compassion for Christ, she was supposed to learn something in doing so. These 
writings “were not crafted primarily to be admired – even by God – as aesthetic artifacts. 
They had serious, practical work to do: to teach their readers, through iterative affective 
performance, how to feel.” 6 
 The image of the suffering Christ persisted through the Reformation, and forms 
the backdrop to early modern discussions of the passions. Late medieval and early 
modern artworks will help frame this discussion. The Isenheim Altarpiece of 1512-13 by 
Matthias Grünewald is particularly helpful. Its Crucifixion (figure 1) is harrowing. The 
roughhewn wood of the cross bends under the weight of the dead body, whose skin tone 
is a putrid greenish grey. Rigor mortis has set in so the fingers are frozen in torment; the 
                                                
2 See Perler 2011, 127-143. Also find there references to Perler’s earlier studies on related topics. 
3 For the classic study of the passions in the early modern period, see James 1997. Also see, Shapiro 2003. 
James explains: “Passions, then, are generally understood to be thoughts or states of the soul which 
represent things as good or evil for us, and are therefore seen as objects of inclination or aversion…. [They] 
have intrinsic physical manifestations which bridge emotion and action and are written on the body in 
facial expressions, blushings, trembling, and postures” (4). In this paper, the focus is primarily on physical 
and psychological suffering. 
4 Bennett 1982, 32.  
5 McNamer 2010, 1. For other important studies of the evolution in medieval Europe of a focus on the 
physicality of the body of Christ and related topics, see Bynum 1987 and Beckwith 1993. 
6 McNamer 2010, 2. Since Bynum 1987, scholars have increasingly discussed the gendered aspect of such 
meditations. For a summary, see McNamer 2010, 3-9.  
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legs, arms and torso are covered with cuts and oozing blood. The witnesses to the death 
react in radically different ways. The Madonna seems ready to swoon from the intensity 
of her grief while John the Evangelist, also grieving, comforts her. The plainness of the 
colors in their robes – vivid white and a rich, dark red – echo the simplicity of their 
emotions and contrast sharply with the complexity of the Magdalene’s garb and 
tormented prayer. More than the others lamenters, she is wracked with emotion. Reason 
prevails on the right side of the painting where John the Baptist holds the Bible in one 
hand and points to Christ with the other, accompanying “He must increase, but I must 
decrease” (John 3:30). This response to Christ’s death is not one of passion, but of 
reason. John the Baptist exhibits unemotional understanding: the passions of the left side 
of the Crucifixion “must” happen and are therefore part of the order of things.  
 The Isenheim Altarpiece contains several other panels including a Resurrection. 
The contrast between the heavy death of the crucifixion and the weightless illumination 
of the Resurrection is striking (figure 2). Many of the same colors appear in both: bright 
white, darkish red, burnt orange, and light green. In the Crucifixion these colors enfold 
the lamenting observers; in the Resurrection they cocoon the joy of immortality. The 
altarpiece suggests an overarching order within which suffering occurs. By meditating on 
the stark contrast between the suffering and the joy, the viewer is asked to learn 
something important about that order.7 
 Grünewald’s altarpiece contains two very different responses to the death of 
Christ: one passionate, the other rational. We find these opposing reactions vividly 
captured in other late medieval and early modern representations of the Madonna’s 
lamentation. As affective meditations increased in popularity between the 13th and 16th 
centuries, the popularity of the pietà (pity) as a subject of painting and sculpture 
unsurprisingly increased as well.  
                                                
7 For an account of early modern accounts of grief and the background to them, see James 1997 who notes 
that emotions were often divided into pairs and that one pair is sadness (dolor) and joy (delectatio). See 6-
7. 
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 The Roettgen Pietà, ca.1325, by an unknown German artist, represents the 
moment of despair when Mary recognizes the depth of her loss (figure 3).8 The work’s 
sculpted instability captures the deep passion of the moment. Mary sits on what appears 
to be a thrown that itself rests on heavy slabs. Like the slabs, the weight of her lower 
body seems solid enough. But the deeply carved and asymmetrical rhythms of her robe 
combine with the terrifying similarity between the exploding wounds of Christ’s body 
and the rosettes of the base to undermine any sense of stability. The odd center of gravity 
of the upper half of the work increases this visual strain. Not only would the Madonna’s 
weight and strength not sustain this dead body, the awkward angle of Jesus’ head 
magnifies the tension and drama of this central part of the sculpture. The rigidity of the 
son’s limbs conflict both with the head’s arc and with the naturalness of Mary’s arms. 
Given the horror of her son’s recent death, the intensity of her pain is fully present. With 
her unfocused eyes, open mouth, and head bent to echo his unnatural tilt, she crumples 
into her thrown in despair. This pain is entirely of the moment and seems to demand that 
the viewer share in her grief. The passion here does not cross the boundary into 
cognition. Rather, the Roettgen Pietà encourages the viewer to share in this present 
passion.  
 A French pietà (figure 4) of the 15th century contains the different responses to 
Christ’s death that we found in the Isenheim Altarpiece. Of the four lamenters, only the 
Magdalene is gripped with emotion while the other three figures, including the Madonna, 
have found their way to a rational state of contemplation. By the end of the 15th century 
in Itay, the pietà had often moved beyond passions to what seems a wholly rational 
meditation. In Pietro Perugino’s Pietà of 1490, rational contemplation has replaced 
suffering. Although the signs of Christ’s wounds have not been totally removed, he is 
offered to the viewer as an object to contemplate (figure 5).  Consistent with the narrative 
offered by John the Baptist in the Isenheim Altarpiece, Christ’s passions have become 
part of the order of things. The painting’s subdued colors and perfect linear perspective 
express quiet introspection. By placing the Madonna’s head at the perspective’s 
                                                
8 Scholars argue that the Roettgen Pietà is one of the first of its kind. For an interesting discussion of the 
work and its relation to other late medieval German representations of Mary, see Satzinger and Ziegeler 
1993, “Marienklagen und Pietà” pp. 241-76. 
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vanishing point, Perugino situates the Madonna in an eternal space of contemplation. 
There is no emotion here and no moment in time; rather, there is contemplation and 
eternity. Finally, consider Michelangelo’s famous Vatican Pietà of 1499 (figure 6). Here, 
Mary is a beautiful young woman coolly offering her son to the viewer. The only sign of 
grief or emotion of any kind is due to the deeply carved marble folds of her clothing. 
They hold the residue of passion, but the main effect of the work is an idealization of 
grief. The Madonna has become like John the Baptist in the Isenheim Altarpiece: she 
understands and asks us to meditate on the rational order of things of which her son’s 
passions are a part.   
 As noted previously, our volume raises questions about the boundary between 
human passions and reason, the relation between passions and cognition, and the means 
by which passions might help in pursing the truth. The artworks discussed here suggest 
answers: the suffering of Christ (and perhaps suffering in general) is part of the order of 
things, cognitive benefits result from recognizing cases of suffering as part of that order, 
and the proper experience of the transition from a state of suffering to one of non-
suffering enables one to grasp truths about that order. One is led to glimpse the rightness 
or justice of things. 
 
 
2. The Boundaries between Reason and Passion 
 The remainder of this paper examines the views of Conway and Leibniz on our 
questions about the relation between the passions and cognition.9 As a means to situate 
Conway and Leibniz in the wider context of early modern philosophy, it will be helpful 
to offer a list of features common to both.  
 Leibniz and Conway are both rationalists in that they believe: (a) the world 
perfectly manifests the rationality and goodness of God and (b) human reason by itself 
can grasp fundamental truths about God and the world. Conway insists, for example, 
                                                
9 I cannot present a full discussion here of the tension between reason and passion in early modern 
philosophy. For a thorough account of the topic, see James 1997. 
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“whatever is correctly understood is most true and certain.”10 The “precepts of truth,” she 
explains, are “innate ideas” which “all men find in themselves” (Principles VI §2 (29)). 
 Leibniz and Conway are both radically ecumenical in that neither takes 
Christianity to be a necessary condition for knowledge about God. Familiarity with 
Christian doctrines like the Trinity and Eucharist is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
such knowledge. For the sake of convenience here, let’s just call the relevant knowledge 
divine knowledge where divine knowledge is a human cognition (however partial) of 
some aspect, property, or attribute of God. Thinkers like Conway and Leibniz assume 
that this is the most significant knowledge there is. Their ecumenicalism is important for 
us because it presumes that the human intellect is capable of having such knowledge 
outside of any particular religious context.  
 Given the rationalism and ecumenicalism of Leibniz and Conway, it is not 
immediately clear how suffering is supposed to fit into this epistemological picture. So, it 
is particularly interesting that they take suffering to have significant moral and cognitive 
benefits. Both consider suffering a necessary condition for some of the most important 
divine knowledge human beings can have. 
 
3. Conway 
 The metaphysics of Conway’s Principles Concerning the Most Ancient and 
Modern Philosophies (finished in the 1670s) is enormously complicated.11 There are 
three features of her metaphysics especially relevant to our topic. 
 
God, Christ, Created World  
 According to Conway, there are three distinct substances: God, Christ, and the 
created world. God, the first substance, emanates Christ, the second substance, who then 
emanates the world. As middle substance between God and the created world, Christ is 
                                                
10 Conway 1996. Abbreviated in what follows as Principles with references to book, section, and page 
number from Coudert and Corse translation. So, citation here is (VI §4 (30)) which is Book VI, section 4, 
p. 30. 
11 Conway composed her work in English, but that manuscript was lost after Henry More translated and 
published it in Latin. There is little reason therefore to fuss about the Latin terms and phraseology found in 
the Principles. For an important study of Conway’s life and thought, see Hutton (2004). For an introduction 
to some of her concerns, see Coudert 1996, Introduction. For a recent account that situates Conway within 
religious concerns broadly construed, see White 2008. 
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the metaphysical conduit and mediator between God and creatures.12 The created world is 
one big infinitely complex vital substance, whose various modes constitute individual 
creatures. The world contains an infinity of creatures in finitum and is constituted of the 
same vital stuff although the vitality can differ radically. Creatures are constituted of an 
active principle and a passive one where each differs from the other only in the degree of 
its vitality. Regardless of the changes in the world, Conway maintains that “the substance 
or essence always remains the same” and there is “merely a change of form in as much as 
the substance relinquishes one form and takes on another” (Principles, VI §3 (29-30)).  
  Finally, the created world is constantly bettering itself so that all creatures 
eventually become conscious moral beings and attain the “excellent attributes” of “spirit 
and light.” Every created thing is capable of “every kind of feeling, perception, or 
knowledge, even love, all power and virtue, joy and fruition.” She explains that even 
dust and sand are capable of all these perfections through various successive transmutations 
which, according to the natural order of things, require long periods of time for their 
consummation, even though […] God, if he so pleases, may accelerate everything and accomplish 
them in a single moment. 
God has so arranged things because he “sees that it is more fitting for all things … to 
attain, through their own efforts, ever greater perfection as instruments of divine wisdom, 
goodness, and power, which operate in them and with them” (Principles IX §6 (66). Of 
particular importance to us here is the fact that all created things will eventually become 
conscious and, as such, will move toward greater and greater perfection. They will not 
                                                
12 The causal notion of emanation endorsed by Conway and Leibniz can be summarized as follows: God 
produces the world through emanation. In emanating the world and its creatures, God is not changed and 
yet creatures acquire the divine attributes and the essences. Each of the attributes of perfection, self-
sufficiency, unity, and being is a function of the other in the sense that the more perfection something has, 
the more unity, and so on.  God is a causal principle that explains the thing (or things) it immediately 
produces; these products themselves can then act as the causal principle for other things. The result of this 
two (or more) tiered process of emanation is a hierarchy of being. At each level in the emanative hierarchy, 
the higher level emanates its attributes or “Ideas” (e.g., Justice) to the lower level in such a way that neither 
the higher entity (the cause) nor its attribute is depleted in any way, while the lower entity (the product) 
comes to instantiate the attribute, though in a weaker or inferior manner. The emanative process is 
continual so that the lower entity instantiates the attribute just as long as the higher emanates the attribute to 
it. Given that God has the highest degree of perfection, self-sufficiency, unity, and reality and given that the 
Ideas (e.g., Justice) that God contains are perfect, the emanative relation entails that each product of God 
exists at a lower level of being than God and has a lesser degree of perfection, self-sufficiency, simplicity, 
reality, and so on. For many early modern Platonists, the products of God’s emanation contain all the 
divine attributes (or “Ideas”), though in a manner inferior to the way in which they exist in God. For more 
on this topic, see Mercer 2001 passim. For more on emanative causation in Conway, see Mercer 
(forthcoming). 
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attain the perfection of God: “Thus a creature is capable of a further and more perfect 
degree of life, ever greater and greater to infinity, but it can never attain equality with 
God. For his infinity is always more perfect than a creature in its highest elevation” 
(Principles IX §7 (67)). 
 
Ecumenical Rationalism 
 In the very first chapters of her Principles, Conway makes clear both her 
rationalism and ecumenical goals. She offers a contemplation of the attributes of God and 
optimistically claims that these can be “communicated to creatures” (Principles II §4 
(13)).  She explains: “And thus the truly invisible attributes of God are clearly seen if 
they are understood either through or in those things which have been made” (Principles 
III §6 (17)).  Conway intends to explain the proper way to understand these attributes. 
Having done so, she assumes that everyone – whatever their religious perspective – can 
have divine knowledge, namely, knowledge of the attributes of God. Conway insists that 
“Jews, Turks [Muslims], and other people” can grasp the divine attributes (at least 
partially).  
 After a thorough discussion of God’s attributes, Conway moves to Christ as the 
middle of the three substances and what directly causes and explains the order, 
rationality, and goodness of the created world. The nature of this middle substance is 
complicated, but roughly, Christ is “the word” or “Logos” by which “God knows all 
things.” As such it is logos ousios, what God understands in the eternal contemplation of 
the divine essence. But Christ is also logos proforikos, the logos made real. Neither logoi 
is the historic Christ who suffered the passions. The logos ousios is best understood as the 
plan or blueprint as conceived by God; the logos proforikos is that plan instantiated in the 
world. The former is unchanging and eternally perfect, the latter is changeable and has 
the “power” to move “from one good to another” (Principles V §3 (24)). An analogy 
might help here. The logos ousios is like the score of a symphony: a static design for the 
performance itself; the logos proforikos is the performance of the work as an ever 
changing, though perfectly designed, unified whole.13 
                                                
13 For a more technical account of the relation between logos ousios and logos proforikos, see Mercer 
(forthcoming). 
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 In order to understand Conway’s views about suffering, it is important to see how 
Christ “the son [of God] himself is immediately present in all things and immediately fills 
all things. In fact, he works immediately in everything in his own way” (Principles V §4 
(25)). Like the musical score, Christ is present everywhere by having determined exactly 
what is being performed although the score on paper stands statically outside any 
particular performance. Christ is also present in every performed note in that the score is 
being performed. The string section moves through its crescendo while the flutes are 
silent and yet the violins’ music and the flutes’ silence are a manifestation of the score. 
Our analogy offers some help in understanding what Conway means when she says: “the 
son [of God] himself is immediately present in all these creatures so that he may bless 
and benefit them.” Like the score, Christ as logos ousios, is the plan for the world; like 
the performing orchestra, Christ as logos proforikos is the plan unfolding. Since the 
world, for Conway, is always becoming morally better, Christ is always benefitting the 
world and its creatures by making them better. And the better they become, the more like 
God they are. In brief, “he raises them by his action to union with God” (Principles V §4 
(25-26). 
 Conway’s decision to call the second substance Christ is a fascinating strategy to 
engage non-Christians in the Christian narrative. Anyone moved by her metaphysics and 
its account of “that excellent order … which appears in all things” will embrace Christ as 
logos and therefore as mediator. She explains that “the wiser among the Jews recognize 
[...] such a mediator, which they call by different names such as Logos, […] Mind, 
Wisdom, the Celestial Adam, etc.”  When “these matters are correctly considered, they 
will contribute greatly to the propagation of true faith and Christian religion among Jews 
and Turks [Muslims] and other infidel nations.” It is important to note that Conway is not 
so much concerned to convert non-Christians to Christian orthodoxy as to engage 
thoughtful people of all faiths in the metaphysical idea that there is a second substance 
that mediates between God and creatures:  
Therefore, those who acknowledge such a mediator and believe in him can be said truly to believe 
in Jesus Christ, even though they do not yet know it and are not convinced that he has already 
come in the flesh. But if they first grant that there is a mediator, they will indubitably come to 
acknowledge also, even if they are unwilling, that Christ is the mediator” (Principles VI §5 (31-
32). 
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It is a brilliant ecumenical strategy. 
  
Suffering, Cognition, and Moral Improvement 
 The Christian narrative maintains that the human soul will be immortal only if 
Christ suffers. So, the moral order of God’s world seems to require the passions. Conway 
takes up this idea and makes it a centerpiece of her philosophy. For her, suffering is the 
key to moral and cognitive improvement. Like Christ, human beings suffer in life; and 
like him, they do so for the good of the world. But Conway goes beyond the standard 
Christian story by extending moral improvement to all creatures.14 Whatever the creature 
(roach, rat, or rhododendron), it suffers for the sake of the good and therefore bears a 
connection to the historic Christ. 
By giving suffering such a central role in her metaphysics, Conway builds a close 
connection between the historic Christ and all creatures:  
Yet when Christ became flesh and entered into his body […], he took on something of our nature 
and consequently of the nature of everything […]. In assuming flesh and blood, he sanctified 
nature so that he could sanctify everything, just as it is the property of a ferment to ferment the 
whole mass.  
[He] descended into time and for a certain period willingly subjected himself to its laws to the 
extent that he suffered great torment and death itself. But the death did not detain him long, for on 
the third day he rose again, and the purpose of all his suffering, up to his death and burial, was to 
heal, preserve, and restore creatures from corruption and death, which came upon them through 
the Fall” (Principles V §6 (27)).  
What is striking about Conway’s version of the Christian narrative is that the historic 
Christ “took on … the nature of everything” and simultaneously acted as the “ferment of 
it all.” The nature of everything in the third substance is vitality, though the vitality here 
is in time. At the very beginning of the Principles, she insists that “in God there exists 
none of the passions … [f]or every passion is temporal having its beginning and end in 
time” (Principles I §5 (9)). So, Christ as logos proforikos emanated the historic Christ 
who thereby became a particular mode of vitality. As such, he sanctified and healed 
everything.  
                                                
14 For more on Conway’s “moral perfectionism,” see White 2008, Part I. 
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 The Isenheim Altarpiece helps explain how the passions of Christ could act to 
“ferment the whole mass.” As the Crucifixion (figure 1) suggests, passions are part of the 
order of things. As the transition from the Crucifixion to the Resurrection (figure 2) 
implies, there is an overarching order, in which the suffering occurs and whose end is joy. 
By meditating on this transition, one becomes aware – as did John the Baptist – that there 
is an order to things. One understands something about the order of the world.15 
 But one does more than understand. In suffering, creatures increase in 
connectedness and vitality. For Conway, one of the most basic features of the third 
substance is that all of its parts are in sympathetic harmony with all the others:  
God has implanted a certain universal sympathy and mutual love into his creatures so that they are 
all members of one body and all, so to speak, brothers, for whom there is one common father […] 
There is also one mother, that unique substance or entity from which all things have come forth, 
and of which they are the real parts and members” (VI §4 (31)). 
Conway, Leibniz, and many other early modern thinkers share this notion of sympathetic 
harmony.16 The basic assumption is that the goodness of the world is partly a function of 
the variety of the creatures within it, partly a function of the sum of the goodness of the 
creatures within it, and partly a function of the order among those creatures where the 
latter is understood primarily in terms of the an enhancement relation among them. Many 
thinkers believed that (some or all) created things have an enhancement relation with 
(some or all) other creatures. When two creatures are in an enhancement relation, an 
increase in the goodness of one will promote an increase in the goodness of another, 
although the relation is non-reciprocal (that is, the increase in the second will not then 
promote an increase in the first). So, for Conway, each part of the third substance is in 
sympathy with every other in the sense that it bears an enhancement relation with it.  
 The sympathy among creatures is important for two reasons. Creatures benefit 
morally from the suffering of other creatures. Consistent with the enhancement relation, 
the suffering of one creature increases the goodness of all other creatures. But creatures 
also benefit in straightforward metaphysical ways: for Conway, suffering makes the 
sufferer more vital and hence metaphysically better. She writes: “all pain and torment 
                                                
15 James discusses the view of some early modern philosophers that there is an “emotional knowledge” and 
a “knowledge of the heart”. For more on this, see James 1997, chapter 10, especially 234-42. 
16 For a fuller account of these notions in the period, see Mercer 2001, chapter 6 and Mercer (forthcoming). 
 12 
stimulates the life or spirit existing in everything that suffers” (Principles VII §1 (43)). 
The third substance is essentially vital stuff that differs in degrees of vitality; the more 
vital something is, the more spiritual it is and hence the more like God; and the more 
spiritual it is, the more “the divine attributes” are “communicated” to creatures. Despite 
the temporary evil of come creatures, the world is progressing toward perfection. Even 
the most crass and immoral creatures will eventually achieve moral goodness through 
suffering: “the worst creatures … become good after many and long torments and 
punishments” (Principles VII Summary (41)). Divine justice is such that sinners must 
pay for their transgressions, but the payment or punishment will itself promote moral 
improvement:  
Just as all the punishments inflicted by God on his creatures are in proportion to their sin, so they 
tend, even the worst, to their good and to their restoration and they are so medicinal as to cure 
these sickly creatures and restore them to a better conditions than they previously enjoyed 
(Principles VI §10 (38)).  
Despite the temporary evil of come creatures, the world is constantly progressing toward 
perfection. The improvement of both the world and its creatures depends on suffering. 
Her position is dramatic: in the same way that the historic Christ suffered for the good of 
the world, so every creature suffers and thereby contributes to worldly good. In the end, 
all parts of the third substance will become morally good through suffering; suffering is a 
sufficient condition for metaphysical improvement and eventually moral goodness.   
 Finally, Conway suggests that as creatures become metaphysically better, they 
also become cognitively better: they understand more about the unity of things and then 
about their justice. As creatures become more vital, they become more conscious of the 
unity between themselves and all other creatures. And as they become more conscious of 
this unity, they begin to grasp the justice in the world. She writes: “the justice of God 
gloriously appears in the transmutation of things” (Principles VI Summary (28)). Indeed, 
“the justice of God shines forth wonderfully” as creatures understand more about the role 
of suffering in the world (Principles VI §8 (36)). We are capable of grasping the 
“principle of true justice” because “God endowed man with the … instinct for justice” 




 Leibniz made significant contributions to philosophy, logic, mathematics, physics, 
jurisprudence, and history. He worked as diplomat, engineer, attorney, and political 
advisor. He corresponded with kings and princesses, and with the most eminent 
intellectuals of the age. As a philosopher, Leibniz is probably best known for his view 
that this is the best of all possible worlds. This optimism was fully felt by Leibniz in that 
he was delighted with the world, but it was also coupled with a realism about human 
suffering. Throughout his long and varied life, he was concerned with the state of 
humanity and how to relieve its afflictions.17  
 Leibniz’s philosophy is enormously complicated and developed over many 
decades. Scholars continue to disagree about the most accurate way of describing some of 
his basic doctrines. I cannot offer an overview of his philosophy here. A brief summary 
will have to suffice of those claims that form the background to his views about the 
boundary between human passions and reason, the relation between passions and 
cognition, and the means by which passions might help in pursing the truth. 
 
God, Substances, and Created World 
 Like Conway, Leibniz believed in a perfectly good God who creates and 
maintains the world through emanation. In the Discours de metaphysique of 1686, he 
explains: “It is very evident that created substances depend upon God, who preserves 
them and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we 
produce our thoughts.”18 Concerning the relation between God and creatures: “For one 
sees clearly that all other substances depend on God in the same way as thoughts emanate 
from our substance, that God is all in all, and that he is intimately united with all 
                                                
17 For a full account of Leibniz’s fascinating life see Antognazza 2009. For an account of Leibniz’s views 
about justice, see Riley 2006. Also see Rutherford 1995, passim. 
18 Unless otherwise noted, all citations to Leibniz’s works will be from Leibniz 1923, abbreviated here as 
‘A’. Translations are usually based on Leibniz 1989. The Discours de metaphysique is in A VI iv [B]; 
references are to section numbers. Discours de metaphysique, § 14: “[I]l est premierement tres manifeste 
que les substances creées dependent de Dieu, qui les conserve, et même qui les produit continuellement par 
une maniere d’emanation, comme nous produisons nous pensées.” 
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creatures.”19 Not only is every substance an emanation of God, each is a constantly acting 
substance that expresses and reflects everything else. Like Conway, Leibniz endorses 
both universal sympathy and the enhancement relation among creatures. But he goes 
farther than Conway in claiming that the only interaction among creatures is one of 
sympathetic harmony. For Leibniz, the individual things of the world – what he first calls 
‘substances’ and then, later in life, ‘monads’ – do not causally interact.  In Discours de 
metaphysique §32, he explains: 
Now, in rigorous metaphysical truth, there is no external cause acting on us except God alone, and 
he alone communicates himself to us immediately in virtue of our continual dependence.  From 
this it follows that there is no other external object that touches our soul and immediately excites 
our perception.  Thus we have ideas of everything in our soul by virtue of God’s continual action 
on us, that is to say, because every effect expresses its cause, and thus the essence of our soul is a 
certain expression, imitation or image of the divine essence, thought, and will, and of all the ideas 
comprised in it.  It can then be said that God is our immediate external object and that we see all 
things by him… God is the sun and the light of souls, the light that lights every man that comes 
into this world, and this is not an opinion new to our times.20  
God emanates all the divine attributes to individual souls, which express the essence of 
God and bear an enhancement relation to each other. Leibniz claims that every creature 
expresses and “imitates” God, though each has its own distinctive degree of clarity:  
Every individual substance contains in its perfect notion the entire universe and everything that 
exists in it, past, present, and future. […] Indeed, all created substances are different expressions 
of the same universe and different expressions of the same universal cause, namely, God. But the 
expressions vary in perfection, just as different representations or drawings of the same town from 
different points of view do.21  
                                                
19 Discours de metaphysique, § 32: “Car on voit fort clairement que toutes les autres substances dependent 
de Dieu comme les pensées emanent de nostre substance; que Dieu est tout en tous, et comment il est uni 
intimement à toutes les creatures”. 
20 Discours de metaphysique § 28: “Or dans la rigeur de la verité Metaphysique, il n’y a point de cause 
externe qui agisse sur nous, excepté Dieu seul, et luy seul communique avec nous immediatement en vertu 
de nostre dependence continuelle.  D’où il s’ensuit qu’il n’y a point d’autre objet externe, qui touche nostre 
ame, et qui excite immediatement nostre perception. Aussi n’avons nous dans nostre ame les idées de 
toutes choses, qu’en vertu de l’action continuelle de Dieu sur nous, c’est à dire parce que tout effect 
exprime sa cause, et qu’ainsi l’essence de nostre ame est une certaine expression, imitation ou image de 
l’essence, pensée et volonté divine, et de toutes les idées qui y sont comprises.  On peut donc dire, que Dieu 
seul est nostre objet immediat hors de nous, et que nous voyons toutes choses par luy […] Dieu est le soleil 
et la lumiere des ames, lumen illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Et ce n’est pas 
d’aujourdhuy qu’on est dans ce sentiment.” 
21 “Omnis substantia singularis in perfecta notione sua involvit totum universum, omniaque in eo existentia 
praeterita praesentia et futura. [...] Imo omnes substantiae singulares creatae sunt diversae expressiones 
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In a very early text, Leibniz works out some of his views about substantial activity and 
unity in an essay entitled “On the Incarnation of God.” He offers a fascinating solution to 
the problem about how Christ can be both God and man.22 Given our concerns here, it is 
significant that the historical Christ is also an expression of divinity and itself 
“contained” in every other. To make the point another way, every substance mirrors and 
contains Christ. 
 Leibniz firmly agrees with Conway that the created world is constituted of an 
infinity of vital creatures in finitum, whose divinely arranged interconnections form an 
intricate unity. He parts company with her when he also insists that each creature is itself 
a substance or monad that expresses the entirety of the perfectly harmonized world and 
does so from its own unique perspective. In fact, Leibniz’s famous doctrine of 
preestablished harmony results from a commitment to a plenitude of created substances 
along with a creative rendering of emanation, unity, and enhancement.23  
 
Ecumenical Rationalism 
 Like Conway, Leibniz embraces ecumenical rationalism. He believes that 
Christianity is not required to arrive at the most profound divine knowledge. While he 
thinks that contemplating the suffering and nature of Christ makes it easier to do this, one 
can know the basic truths about God without knowing anything about Christianity.24 
 In the preface to his Theodicy of 1710, Leibniz makes several claims relevant to 
our topic. He is clear that one of the main goals of religion is to effect virtue. The aim of 
religion is: 
to withdraw us from any approach to vice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with 
virtue. That was the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise men who founded 
                                                                                                                                            
ejusdem universi, ejusdemque causae universalis, nempe Dei; sed variant perfectione expressionis ut 
ejusdem oppidi diversae repraesentationes vel scenographiae ex diversis punctis visus.” (A VI iv [B] 1646; 
emphasis in text). 
22 See A VI i 532-51. For a fuller account of these views, see Mercer 2001, 146-9, 324-5. 
23 Mercer 2001, chapters 7-10; Rutherford 1995 passim. 
24 Leibniz’s views about the role of Christianity in the pursuit of divine knowledge changed over the years. 
In this discussion, the focus will be on his later views, especially on those of the Theodicy of 1710. 
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religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the purest and most enlightened 
religion.25  
He further insists that although Christianity is only one among several enlightened 
religions, it is the “purest and most enlightened” and the one founded by a “divine” 
personage. So, he takes Christ to be divine, but does not deny that other religions are 
enlightened, suggesting that “the divine light (lumiere divine)”is there to be glimpsed by 
anyone, of whatever religion. Because the human intellect is naturally poised to discover 
“beautiful conceptions” and “divine light,” all people have to do – whether Jew, Muslim, 
Christian, or other – is avoid the obscuring “opinions of men” and discern the “beautiful 
conceptions” related to “the greatness and goodness of God.” For example, about the 
doctrine of immortality, he explains: “it was not proclaimed for popular acceptance until 
Jesus Christ lifted the veil.” Although “Moses had already expressed the beautiful ideas 
of the greatness and the goodness of God …, Jesus Christ developed fully the 
consequences of these conceptions, proclaiming that divine goodness and justice shine 
forth to perfection in God’s designs for the souls of men.”26 The Theodicy is 
ecumenically radical: “there are countless paths open to God, giving him means of 
satisfying his justice and his goodness” (Theodicy § 9). In the end, all human beings are 




Leibniz’s Suffering: Moral and Cognitive Benefits27 
 Leibniz agrees with Conway that there are moral and cognitive benefits to 
suffering. Unlike Conway, however, he does not think that such benefits come from 
                                                
25 “[…] pour nous éloigner des approches du vice, nous accoutumer au bien, et pour nous rendre la vertu 
familiere. C’étoit le but de Moïse, & d’autres bons Legislateurs, des sages Fondateurs des Ordres 
Religieux, & sur-tout de Jesus-Christ, divin Fondateur de la Religion la plus pure & la plus éclairée.” 
26 “[…] mais elle n’étoit point autorisé d’une maniere populaire, jusqu'à ce que Jesus Christ leva le voile 
[...] Moïse avoit déja donné les belles idees de la grandeur & de la bonté de Dieu [...] mais Jesus Christ en 
établissoit toutes les consequences, et il faisoit voir que la bonté & la justice divine éclatent parfaitement 
dans ce que Dieu prépare aux ames” (Theodicy, Preface). 
27 There are many excellent books on Leibniz’s philosophy, but it is striking how little work has been done 
on the cognitive benefits of suffering. For good introductions to his account of the problem of evil, which is 
related to the question about suffering in the world, see Rutherford, especially chapters 1-3 and Jolley 2005, 
chapter 6.  
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suffering itself. By itself, a passion can have no moral or cognitive benefit. Any benefit 
deriving from a passion must come from what is learned in the transition from a state of 
suffering to one of non-suffering. Such a transition can offer three kinds of benefits. The 
most basic benefit derived from such a transition is the pleasure of relief. In the Theodicy, 
he writes: “Evil often serves to make us savor good the more; sometimes too it 
contributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers.”28 The movement from suffering to 
non-suffering leads to a greater appreciation of the second state.29 The pleasure in it and 
the recognition of that pleasure is increased because of its concurrence with the previous 
state. In the Theodicy, he explains: 
Use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of the senses when these are 
mingled with that which borders on pain, to prove that there is something of like nature in 
intellectual pleasures. A little acid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; 
shadows enhance colors; and even dissonance in the right place gives relief to harmony. […] Do 
men relish health enough, or thank God enough for it, without having been sick? And is it not 
most often necessary that a little evil render the good more discernible, that is to say, greater?30 
 A second benefit produced by the transition from suffering to non-suffering 
occurs when there is a sense of “victory” over the passion. This happens when the 
sufferer has refused to give into the pain or the temptation of the passion: she sheds the 
moment of intense passion and feels strength in having done so. Leibniz suggests that 
moral benefits follow such small victories. One gains a sense of her strength and the 
inspiration to acquire more. He writes in the Theodicy: “it is well to observe that the 
vexations and pains attendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into 
pleasure, through the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of the force of their 
                                                
28 “La peine sert aussi pour l’amendement & pour l’exemple, & le mal sert souvent pour mieux goûter le 
bien, & quelquefois aussi il contribue à une plus grande perfection de celui qui le souffre” Theodicy (§ 23). 
29 It seems to have been fairly common for seventeenth-century philosophers to think that pleasure comes 
from control over one’s passions. See James 1997, 264. 
30 “On s’est servi de tout temps des comparaisons prises des plaisirs des sens, mêlés avec ce qui approche 
de la douleur, pour faire juger qu’il y a quelque chose de semblable dans les plaisirs intellectuels. Un peu 
d’acide, d’acre ou d’amer, plait souvent mieux que du sucre; les ombres rehaussent les couleurs; & meme 
une dissonance placée où il faut, donne du relief à l’harmonie. Nous voulons être effrayés par des danseurs 
de corde qui font sur le point de tomber, & nous voulons que les Tragedies nous fassent presque pleurer. 
Goute-t-on assez la santé, & en rend-on assez graces à Dieu, sans avoir jamais été malade? En ne faut-il pas 
le plus souvent qu’un peu de mal rende le bien plus sensible, c’est-à-dire plus grand?” Theodicy (§ 12). 
 18 
mind.”31 When someone has mustered the “force of mind” to overcome the passions, she 
has taken a step toward moral improvement. The improvement is encouraged by the 
pleasure derived from the transition and the awareness of its source or “the force” in 
one’s mind. So, unlike Conway, Leibniz does not think that suffering is by itself 
sufficient for moral improvement. But he does think suffering is both necessary and 
sufficient for some sorts of moral improvement. An awareness of the increased pleasure 
and personal power that comes from victory over passions will not occur without them. 
 Given our concerns, the most significant benefit derived from the suffering-to-
non-suffering transition is an understanding of the justice and beauty of God’s world. To 
be perfectly clear: without suffering, there cannot be a transition from suffering to non-
suffering and, without the transition, there will not be a proper awareness of the harmony 
of God’s world. Therefore, suffering is a necessary condition for such understanding. The 
Theodicy claims that all human beings – regardless of religion – can find a path to God. 
They can do so because they all suffer and therefore all have the opportunity to learn 
about the justice and harmony of God’s world. As one moves from a state of suffering to 
non-suffering, she not only feels the pleasure of the non-suffering more than she 
otherwise would, she is also motivated to reflect on the order and justice of the whole. 
Such reflection is the first step toward glimpsing its profound harmony and beauty.  
 In Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, I argue that Leibniz 
developed a version of preestablished harmony twenty years before the Discours de 
metaphysique of 1686. At the very time he is constructing his account of worldly 
harmony, he is also concerned to explore the role of suffering in that world. During the 
years 1670-71, he often notes that human afflictions help them grasp divine harmony. He 
discusses the role of human suffering in general, and wonders about the cognitive and 
emotional distress that comes from confusion about the world and its true nature. He 
contrasts the pain of this confusion to the joy of cognitive success. When such pain is 
followed by some small insight into the harmony of God’s world, it becomes “delightful” 
and leads to “admiration” of God. A “dissonant beat” can lead us to recognize the 
                                                
31 “Il est bon cependant de remarquer, que les chagrins & les peines qui accompagnent la victoire sur les 
passions, tournent en quelques-uns en plaisir, par le grand contentement qu’ils trouvent dans le sentiment 
vif de la force de leur esprit […]”. (Theodicy § 329). 
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“wondrous” interconnections among things so that we are led to “the ruler who embraces 
the infinite.”32 In a striking passage from 1671 (when he is first developing the metaphor 
of mind as a mirror), he writes:  
Thus, if there are many mirrors, that is, many minds recognizing our goods, there will be a greater 
light, the mirrors blending the light not only in the [individual] eye but also among each other. The 
gathered splendor produces glory. This is part of the reason for the deformity in mind: otherwise 
there would be nothing in the shadow to be magnified through the reflection of the mirrors (A VI i 
464).  
 Like Conway, Leibniz believes that the improvement of one creature increases the 
goodness of the world. Consistent with sympathetic harmony and the enhancement 
relation, one mirror adds to the light and insight of all the others. It follows that as one 
creature benefits from the suffering-to-non-suffering transition, so do all the others. The 
cognitive benefit of suffering, therefore, is profound: the movement from suffering or 
confusion to pleasure or insight increases the chance for divine knowledge and insight 
into universal harmony. The use of the enhancement relationship is dramatic. Although 
minds are deformed, they can be made better through their sympathetic mirroring of one 
another. God has made the world so that each mind can help to lead the others out of 
shadow. The mirroring of minds allows them to see an “unexpected” unity “where no one 
would suspect a connection” (A VI i 484). As he makes the point a few years later: “The 
most confused discord fits into the order of the most exquisite harmony unexpectedly, as 
a painting is set off by shadow, as the harmony due to dissonances transforms the 
dissonances into consonance” (A VI iii 126). The world is better because apparent 
disorder will “unexpectedly” reveal “the wonderful reason” behind this “greatest” of 
symmetries (A VI iii 122).  
 The artworks of section 1 help highlight Leibniz’s underlying point. The Roettgen 
Pietà represents Mary at the most profound moment of her suffering (figure 3). Her pain 
is that of a particular moment in time. In its grip, there is no cognitive benefit. But when 
this moment has passed, as it has done for Mary in the La Pietà de Villeneuve-lès-
Avignon (figure 4), it is possible to appreciate the transition from suffering to non-
suffering and, more importantly, the place of the previous passion in the order of things. 
                                                
32 A V i 485. For similar early views, see A VI i 466, 479. 
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The signs of Christ’s wounds are still evident: the passion and pain are recent. But she 
has moved beyond them to a state of rational contemplation of their place in God’s world. 
This Madonna, like Michelangelo’s (figure 6), willingly accepts the overarching harmony 
and beauty of the world. Like John the Baptist in the Isenheim Altarpiece, the Mary of 
these later works sees the justice and order of the world in which her son suffered so 
profoundly. 
 Leibniz endorses the overall account given of these artworks. He explains in the 
Theodicy:  
And it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in God who gives us insight into his 
infinite goodness and prepares us for his love, in spite of the appearances of harshness that may 
repel us, are an admirable exercise for the virtues of Christian theology.33  
Because God’s world is perfectly just and beautiful, the transition from suffering to non-
suffering offers insight into its nature. Like John the Baptist, one can see the order in 
things and be delighted: “we should see, and should not believe only, that what God has 
done is the best” (Theodicy § 44). According to Leibniz, God has created the world to 
make this easy. Even in our confusion and pain, all we have to do is contemplate the 
order of things: 
But therein we confess our ignorance of the facts, and we acknowledge, moreover, before we see 
it, that God does all the best possible, in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his 
actions. It is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests of this, when we see 
something entire, some whole complete in itself, and isolated, so to speak, among the works of 
God […]. We cannot wonder enough at the beauty and the contrivance of its structure.34  
In the same way that the aesthetic pleasure of a symphony depends on the experience of 
the transitions and order among its parts, so the comprehension of the justice and beauty 
of God’s world depends on the experience of its transitions: “Order, proportions, 
harmony delight us; painting and music are samples of these: God is all order; he always 
                                                
33 “Et il ne faut point douter que cette Foi & cette confiance en Dieu, qui nous fait envisager sa bonté 
infinie, & nous prépare à son amour, malgré les apparences de dureté qui nous peuvent rebutter, ne soient 
un exercice excellent des vertus de la Théologie Chrétienne”. Theodicy (§45). 
34 “[…] mais c’est avouer notre ignorance sur les faits; c’est reconnoître cependant, avant que de voir, que 
Dieu fait tout, le mieux qu’il est possible, suivant la sagesse infinie qui regle ses actions. Il est vrai que 
nous en avons déja des preuves & des essais devant nos yeux, lorsque nous voyons quelque chose d’entier, 
quelque tout accompli en soi, & isolé, pour ainsi dire, parmi les Ouvrages de Dieu. Un tel tout, formé, pour 
ainsi dire, de la main de Dieu, est une plante, un animal, un homme. Nous ne saurions assez admirer la 
beauté & l’artifice de sa structure”. Theodicy (§ 134).  
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keeps truth of proportions, he makes universal harmony; all beauty is an effusion of his 
rays.”35  
 Leibniz insists in the Theodicy that “there are countless paths open to God.” 
Regardless of one’s religion, that path is available to anyone who can see the harmony 
and beauty of things. Human beings are like Christ in that they all must suffer; and their 
suffering is like Christ’s in that it is done for the sake of the good. God has constructed 
the world so that human suffering has a cognitive payoff: the movement from suffering to 
non-suffering helps in the recognition of divine justice and in the acquisition of divine 
knowledge. He explains:  
And when we succeed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise be impressed by his greatness 
and charmed by his goodness, which will show themselves through the clouds of a seeming reason 
that is deceived by outward appearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to 




 Conway and Leibniz are ecumenical rationalists. Yet they believe that suffering 
contributes to moral development and assists in the acquisition of divine knowledge. The 
passions of Christ motivate them to see the benefits to suffering. For both of these 
rationalists, passions have cognitive benefits. Like Christ, human beings suffer in life and 
do so for the good of other creatures. Like John the Baptist in the Isenheim Alterpeice, 
Conway and Leibniz see suffering as part of the rational order of God’s world. 
Recognizing how passions fit into that order is the first step to important knowledge 
about God and creation. In the end, Conway and Leibniz ask us to meditate on the 
rational order of things while acknowledging its moments of pain. 
                                                
35 “L’ordre, les proportions, l’harmonie nous enchantent, la Peinture & la Musique en sont des échantillons; 
Dieu est tout ordre, il garde toujours la justesse des proportions, il fait l’harmonie universelle: toute la 
beauté est un épanchement de ses rayons” (Theodicy, Preface, 27). 
36 “Et quand on y réussira à l’égard de sa justice, on sera également frappé de sa grandeur & charmé de sa 
bonté, qui paroitront à travers les nuages d’une Raison apparente, abusée par ce qu’elle voit, à mesure que 










Figure 1. Detail of Isenheim Altarpiece: Crucifixion by Matthias Grünewald, 1512-1513. 





Figure 2. Isenheim Altarpiece: Resurrection by Matthias Grünewald, 1512-1513. 








Figure 4. La Pietà de Villeneuve-lès-Avignon by Enguerrand Quarton, c. 1455. 
(Louvre Museum, Paris) 
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Figure 5. Pietà con i Santi Giovanni Evangelista, Maria Maddalena, Nicodemo e 
Giuseppe d’Arimatea by Pietro Perugino, 1490. (Uffizi Gallery, Milan) 
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